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Abstract
How does democracy develop throughout a country once leaders in the national capital introduce
or expand civil liberties and hold competitive elections—in other words, after democratic
transition? The subnational democracy literature has shown that non-democratic subnational
political regimes can endure within countries even after democratic transition. Yet, the democratic
consolidation literature has not addressed how these enclaves are eliminated throughout the
country or the territorial consolidation of democracy. This paper offers an explanation for the
territorial consolidation of democracy. We argue that greater corruption control, a shift toward a
unitary system of government, and a move toward centralized candidate selection promote
territorial consolidation. Statistical analyses using V-Dem data, which cover 182 countries from
1900 to 2017, provide support for our argument.
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Introduction
The process of democratic consolidation remains relatively opaque despite the proliferation of
studies of democracy in the last three decades. How does democracy develop throughout a country
once leaders in the national capital introduce or expand civil liberties and hold competitive
elections—in other words, after democratic transition? The subnational democracy literature has
shown that non-democratic subnational political regimes can endure within countries even after
democratic transition (Gervasoni, 2010; Gibson, 2013; Giraudy, 2015; McMann, 2006). In some
provinces, cities, and villages residents do not enjoy civil liberties or free and fair subnational
elections, for example. Clearly democratic transition is not sufficient to ensure the territorial
consolidation of democracy within a country.
Research on democratic consolidation provides little guidance about the territorial
development of democracy within a country. One strand of the literature discusses the importance
of the population developing democratic attitudes (O’Donnell, 1992; Rustow, 1970). Yet, studies
have highlighted that pockets of non-democracy exist because of subnational elites’ strategies
(Gervasoni, 2010; Gibson, 2013; McMann, 2006; Ziblatt, 2009), not because of popular support
for authoritarianism. A second strand of the democratic consolidation literature emphasizes that
consolidation requires the co-optation of authoritarian elites and the building of consensus of
among elites (O’Donnell, 1992; Higley and Burton, 1989; Valenzuela, 1992); however, these
studies do not explicitly discuss subnational elites. Rather their focus is on national leaders and
military officials. A third strand of literature, which investigates the impact of the mode of
transition on consolidation, does not examine the role of subnational actors, institutions, or
practices in transition.1 These strands of literature overlook subnational regimes in favor of
aggregate country characteristics (e.g. popular attitudes) and politics inside national capitals (e.g.
national leaders and processes), yet evidence has shown that non-democratic subnational political
regimes are an obstacle to democratic consolidation.
The subnational democracy literature also has not provided a theory of the territorial
development of democracy within a country. This scholarship has primarily examined the
existence and endurance of non-democratic subnational political regimes (Beer, 2003; Beer and
Mitchell, 2006; Behrend 2011; Benton, 2012; Borges, 2011; Danielson et al., 2013; Eisenstadt,
2011; Eisenstadt and Rios, 2014; Hale, 2007; Herrmann, 2010; Hill 1994; Gervasoni, 2010;
Giraudy, 2015; Lankina and Getachew, 2012; Lawson, 2000; Magaloni et al., 2007; McMann and

1 See, for example: Di Palma 1990; Karl 1990; Karl and Schmitter 1991; Munck and Leff 1997; O'Donnell 1992;
O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986.
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Petrov, 2000; Mickey, 2015; Montero, 2010; Moraski and Reisinger, 2003; Munro, 2001; Petrov,
2004; Rebolledo, 2012; Saikkonen, 2012; Sidel, 2014; Tudor and Ziegfeld, 2016). Moreover, most
studies investigate countries where subnational variation in democracy continues to this day, so
their utility in explaining change is limited. The small number of studies that have examined change
over time explain the democratization of individual authoritarian subnational regimes, not the
wholesale elimination of non-democratic subnational regimes in a country, which may or may not
be identical processes (Gibson, 2005; Gibson, 2013; Giraudy, 2010; Giraudy, 2015;Hiskey and
Canache, 2005; Lankina and Getachew, 2006; Gel'man and Lankina, 2008; Mickey, 2008; Mickey,
2015). Also, the generalizability of the findings of this prior research may be limited; the studies,
in fact, examine only four countries, all with federal systems of government—Argentina, Mexico,
Russia, and the United States.
Offering an explanation of the territorial consolidation of democracy within a country is
important for theoretical, normative, and practical reasons. Theoretically, it can help eliminate the
current “black box” between democratic transition theory and our understanding of the long-term
success of democracy. Normatively, democratizing remaining pockets of non-democracy in
countries that have undergone democratic transition extends democratic political rights and
institutions to the entire population of a country. Practically, an explanation can provide guidance
to democracy advocates and policy makers who aim to ensure the full development and survival
of democracy in countries. This practical guidance is all the more important during this time of
democratic recession, which has revealed that democracy is not as solidly rooted in countries as
we had thought (Carothers, 2015; Diamond, 2015).
This paper offers a theory of the territorial consolidation of democracy. We begin with the
concept of subnational regime variation or unevenness—in other words, all subnational political
units in a country do not exhibit the same de facto level of democracy on the authoritarian-hybriddemocratic spectrum. Recent research has demonstrated that globally and over time, the factors
that have most contributed to unevenness are largely distal ones, which remain static over time.
These factors—rugged terrain and large and ethnically diverse populations—make it more difficult
for national leaders to extend control over the territory of their countries (McMann et al., 2016a).
At the same time, we know through case study research and exploration of new crossnational data
that democracy has been territorially consolidated in some countries historically (McMann, 2013;
Coppedge et al., 2018a). Drawing from this prior research, we seek to explain why unevenness
decreases with respect to each country's baseline level of unevenness. Our focus is not on trying to
understand why some countries experience more or less unevenness than others.
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In order to develop a theory of territorial consolidation of democracy, we hone in on
decreases in unevenness in the democratic direction. In other words, we are interested in the
democratization of subnational authoritarian enclaves in countries that lean democratic, rather
than the “authoritarianization” of subnational democratic enclaves in countries that lean nondemocratic. We recognize, however, that some factors may have only the former effect; whereas,
other factors might promote greater evenness regardless of whether it is in a democratic or
authoritarian direction. Our theory, therefore, addresses both types of factors.
In seeking to understand how unevenness diminishes, this paper examines two
manifestations of it—unevenness in the freeness and fairness of subnational elections and
unevenness in government officials’ respect for civil liberties. These two forms of unevenness
often do not occur together, as our data below indicate. Also, they pose different types of
challenges to the territorial consolidation of democracy. Whereas a variety of government officials
can violate civil liberties in a subnational political unit, subnational politicians can most readily
manipulate subnational elections. Our theory takes into account these differences.
Our argument is that the quality of subnational elections and government officials’ respect
for civil liberties grow more uniform throughout a country when the national government can
more effectively extend control over the territory of the country. Changes to informal practices
and institutions can increase national government control. These include greater corruption
control, a shift toward a unitary system of government, and a move toward centralized candidate
selection. Corruption control is particularly important to increase evenness in respect for civil
liberties as a variety of different officials can violate civil liberties in a subnational political unit.
The institutional changes are especially influential in promoting uniform subnational election
quality as these changes reduce the autonomy of subnational officials, who can most readily
manipulate elections.
We test our argument about factors that decrease unevenness and thus territorially
consolidate democracy by using country fixed-effect linear models and by employing Varieties of
Democracy (V-Dem) data, which cover 182 countries from 1900 to 2017. Our results provide
support for our argument.
This paper illuminates the topic of democratic consolidation by examining the territorial
consolidation of democracy. In sum, it explores an undertheorized topic, investigates a puzzle that
has not yet been studied, and offers an original argument to explain this puzzle and improve a
body of theory. The paper tests the argument in more than 150 countries for more than a century.
The paper proceeds by first describing the argument in greater detail. The second section
introduces alternative explanations. The paper then elaborates on the data used and reviews general
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patterns in unevenness to underscore how frequently the phenomenon occurs and its relationship
to regime type and regime change. The penultimate sections test the argument and illustrate it with
cases, and the final section concludes.

I. Argument
We argue that government officials’ respect for civil liberties and the quality of subnational
elections grow more uniform throughout a country when the national government can more
effectively extend control over the territory of the country. This is consistent with prior research
that found that countries that are prone to unevenness face obstacles to the government extending
control over the territory (McMann et al., 2016a). We expect that the same relationship will be
important to not only explaining the level of unevenness, but also to explaining how it decreases.
However, because many of the factors that make a country prone to unevenness are static or near
static—a rugged terrain and a large and ethnically diverse population—we look at time variant
factors instead to explain change over time. We expect that changes to informal practices and
institutions can promote evenness.
For informal practices and institutions to increase evenness in either respect for civil
liberties or quality of subnational elections, they must change the behavior of the relevant officials.
Both subnational officials and locally-based national officials can violate civil liberties in a
subnational political unit. For example, in the Ghanzi district of Botswana, there is evidence that
local police and locally-based national wildlife officials have tortured, rather than just prosecuted,
members of the Baswara, for poaching and trespassing.2 It is important to ensure compliance of
both subnational and national officials in order to promote civil liberties. By contrast, to make
subnational elections freer and fairer, subnational officials are the main target because they can
most readily interfere with subnational elections. They live in the territory, so they are present
before, during, and after an election and they are embedded in the local community. This makes
it easier for them to use carrots and sticks against potential opposition. For example, governors’
economic monopolies in Russian provinces enabled them to threaten the livelihoods of potential
opposition candidates and dissuade them from running. This helped ensure governors’ re-election
(McMann, 2006). By contrast, national election officials are typically located in a country’s capital,
so it is more difficult for them to manipulate subnational elections. For free and fair subnational

2 The Baswara were denied land they once used for herding and forced to hunt and gather, raising the issue of whether
the poaching and trespassing laws were even just (Good, 2008).

6

elections then, it is especially important for the national government to bring subnational officials
under its control.
With this logic in mind, we make a two-pronged argument. First, we contend that
hampering the informal practice of corruption will increase evenness in all government officials’
respect for civil liberties and the freeness and fairness of subnational elections. Second, we argue
that institutional changes that reduce subnational officials’ autonomy will promote evenness in
subnational election freeness and fairness but not in respect for civil liberties.
When officials focus on governing rather than using public office for private gain, we
would expect uniformity in respect for civil liberties and the quality of subnational elections to
increase. Following democratic transition, the national government has a mandate to consolidate
democracy, including ensuring that civil liberties are respected and subnational elections are free
and fair throughout the country. Corruption is a particularly vexing obstacle to completing these
tasks. In countries where corruption is pervasive, lower level officials and bureaucrats will not carry
out the national government’s instructions when they conflict with schemes for personal
enrichment or they will manipulate their implementation for personal gain. National executives
themselves can be distracted by the temptation of using public office for private gain rather than
consolidating democracy. Corruption can also derail national legislators from the objective of
serving their constituents, for example by protecting them from civil rights abuses by national
officials. Similarly, it can distract judges from punishing those who commit abuses and thus
deterring future violations. Also, the violation of rights is sometimes integral to schemes for
personal enrichment so that corruption actually fuels civil liberties abuses. For example, in
Indonesia’s West Papua, the police and military have run protection rackets connected to the large
mining and logging operations on the island. Profits from this illicit activity have encouraged the
police and military to crack down on residents; they have broken up public meetings and arrested
and beaten opposition leaders, among other abuses (King, 2004).
Because a wide variety of government officials and bureaucrats can engage in corruption,
reducing this informal practice across the board is helpful to ending civil liberties violations. Many
different officials and bureaucrats can violate the rights of those living in particular subnational
political units, so refocusing everyone’s efforts from private gain to the task of governance can
help end civil liberties violations in those areas so that respect for civil liberties becomes more
uniform throughout the country. Moreover, because civil liberties abuses are sometimes central to
personal enrichment schemes, ending the schemes reduces the abuses.
Whereas many different officials and bureaucrats can violate civil liberties, primarily
subnational officials manipulate subnational elections. Consequently, corruption control targeted
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at them is helpful to increasing evenness in subnational election freeness and fairness. Subnational
officials should be focused on implementing new democratic institutions and practices, rather than
personal enrichment. In order to control subnational corruption, however, the national executive
must be also focused on governing, rather than personal enrichment. Following democratic
transition, the national executive is often the face and driver of democratic consolidation: he or
she has typically been elected democratically and has a mandate to establish a full-fledged
democracy. Consider, for example, Lech Wałęsa and Nelson Mandela who became presidents
during the democratic transitions of Poland and of South Africa, respectively, and then were tasked
with consolidating democracy in their countries. National executives must not get distracted with
personal enrichment in order to ensure that subnational officials are also focused on
democratization.
Institutional changes that reduce subnational officials’ autonomy will promote evenness in
subnational election freeness and fairness but not in respect for civil liberties. This is because
primarily subnational officials manipulate elections, whereas a wide variety of officials can violate
civil liberties. When subnational officials’ autonomy is reduced, they cede influence over
subnational election freeness and fairness to national officials, who, following democratic
transition, attempt to expand democratic practices and institutions throughout the country. Moves
toward a unitary system of government and more centralized party politics are two key institutional
changes that can promote evenness in subnational election freeness and fairness.
A shift from federalism toward a unitary system of government can decrease subnational
officials’ authority to oversee subnational elections and thus enable national officials to better
ensure election freeness and fairness. Countries with unitary systems of government hold
subnational elections: ninety-five percent of countries with unitary governments in 2012 were
holding subnational elections.3 However, as unitary systems do not grant subnational levels any
spheres of autonomy (Riker, 1964), subnational officials are much more limited, than their
counterparts in federalist countries, in their ability to manipulate the elections. This is consistent
with the subnational democracy literature, which contends, or at least implicitly assumes, that
unevenness is a result of federalism. This is reflected in the fact that federal states, specifically
Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Russia, and the United States, are most commonly studied.4

3 This statistic was calculated from the variables Unitary government, described in Appendix Table A1, and the
Subnational elections held variable (v2elffelrbin) in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018a).
4 Russia was a federal state at the time of the studies. Beer, 2003; Behrend, 2011; Benton, 2012; Borges, 2011; Hale,
2007; Herrmann, 2010; Gervasoni, 2010; Giraudy, 2015; Gibson, 2013; Hill, 1994; Lankina and Getachew, 2006;
Lawson, 2000; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros and Estévez, 2007; McMann and Petrov, 2000; Mickey, 2015; Montero, 2010;
Moraski and Reisinger, 2003.
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Party rules can also affect how much influence national leaders have in subnational political
units. For example, selection of national legislative party candidates throughout the country by
national party leaders reduces subnational officials’ ability to put those loyal to them in the national
legislature and thus their capacity to keep the national government from interfering in their
territories. A national legislature not packed with subnational loyalists can work with other national
officials to enforce national electoral laws and provide support to electoral oppositions in
subnational political units to ensure higher quality elections there. This resonates with the
subnational democracy literature, which has attributed the maintenance of non-democratic
subnational regimes to local leaders’ ability to prevent the national government from getting drawn
into local political conflicts (Behrend, 2011; Benton, 2012; Gibson, 2013). In sum, we expect that
when party rules change to enable greater national influence in subnational politics, unevenness in
the freeness and fairness of subnational elections will decrease because subnational officials’ ability
to manipulate these elections is diminished.
It is important to note that two of the factors we identify should predict an increase in
unevenness in either a democratic or authoritarian direction; whereas, the third should predict an
increase in only a democratic direction. A reduction in corruption and a shift toward a more unitary
system should each facilitate greater evenness in either direction. By contrast, more centralized
candidate selection likely promotes evenness in the democratic direction because for a change in
candidate selection to matter the national legislature most have some genuine influence. National
legislatures are likely more influential the more democratic the national regime. We expect that
each of three factors has an independent effect on evenness and that they do not need to act in
unison in order for there to be an effect.
From this argument we derive the following hypotheses.
First, we hypothesize that when corruption decreases in a country, uniformity in the quality
of subnational elections and government officials’ respect for civil liberties increase. This variable,
Corruption control, is measured with the V-Dem political corruption index. We reversed the scale so
that higher values indicate less corruption. We expect that decreases in a wide variety of forms of
corruption will reduce unevenness in government officials’ respect for civil liberties. We include
the variables Public sector corruption control, Executive corruption control, Judicial corruption control, and
Legislature corruption control from V-Dem to test this idea. For each, higher values denote less
corruption. Our argument indicates that control of national executive corruption should have the
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greatest impact on unevenness in subnational election freeness and fairness.5 Executive corruption
control allows us to test that.
Second, we hypothesize that when a country’s system of government grows more unitary,
subnational election quality, but not government respect for civil liberties, grows more uniform
throughout the country. We measure this using the variable Unitary, based on the Quality of
Governance dataset. A higher value represents a more unitary system.
Third, we expect that when national party leaders gain more control of the national
legislative party candidate selection process, uniformity in subnational election quality, but not
respect for civil liberties, increases in a democratic direction. Centralized candidate selection from the
V-Dem dataset measures this and is reversed so that increasingly higher values represent more
centralized control of candidate selection.
The reverse of these hypothesized relationships is unlikely, suggesting that the causal
direction of our argument is correct. Greater uniformity in the quality of subnational elections and
government officials’ respect for civil liberties is unlikely to increase corruption control. And,
greater evenness in subnational election freeness and fairness is unlikely to result in a shift toward
a unitary system of government or centralized candidate selection. Moreover, our model
specification, described in the Analysis section, lags our dependent variables in order to test the
hypothesized causal direction.

II. Alternative Explanations
While our argument focuses on increased evenness as a result of the national government
extending control throughout the country, it is also possible that respect for civil liberties and
subnational election freeness and fairness grow more uniform as a result of diffusion or the
independent development of democracy in many subnational political units. We consider
alternative explanations that fit into each of these three categories.
As the capacity of the national government increases, national leaders could more
effectively extend control throughout the country bringing subnational laggards into line with
national democratization efforts. This is consistent with the state-building literature which
examines the capacity of the national government to bring the periphery under its control (Mann,
1989; Tilly, 1990). We test this using Hanson and Sigman’s State Capacity Dataset, which is more
comprehensive conceptually and offers better year and country coverage than other measures of
5 Following executive corruption control, subnational official corruption control would be most important; however,
data are not available to also test that.
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state capacity. Their measure is an index of 24 indicators using Bayesian latent variable analysis
and measuring administrative, coercive, and extractive capacity from 1960 to 2009 for up to 163
countries in a given year (Hanson and Sigman, 2013). State capacity ranges from -2.9 to 2.5 with a
higher value indicating more state capacity.
A minimal requirement for the consolidation of democracy throughout a country is a
national government’s ability to ensure that the entire territory is secure. The absence of internal
armed conflict can be thought of as the bare minimum for the national unity or stateness that
scholars have highlighted as important to democratization (Linz and Stepan, 1996; Rustow, 1970).
It is possible then that as armed conflict declines within a country, greater uniformity in
government respect for civil liberties and subnational election freeness and fairness develops. To
test this we use the measure Armed conflict, where conflict is coded as 1 and no conflict is coded as
0. The data are from Clio Infra (clio-infra.eu) drawing on Brecke (2001) and are available from the
V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2018a).
Two other factors that can help national governments extend control over territory have
been also shown to increase the likelihood of democratic consolidation. As a country develops
economically, national leaders have more resources to bring territory under their control. This
could include extending physical infrastructure to better incorporate outlying areas, basing more
national government representatives in subnational units to monitor and enforce national
directives, and providing more goods, services, and targeted programs in exchange for local
populations’ loyalty. Concurrently, economic development has been shown to be correlated with
higher levels of democracy (Epstein et al., 2016; Lipset, 1959). In our analysis, economic
development is measured by the variable GDP per capita, which is the natural log of the per capita
GDP as recorded by Maddison. We test the impact of GDP per capita contingent on the variable
Democracy, drawn from V-Dem’s Liberal Democracy Index (Maddison, 2010).
Higher education levels in a country can make it easier for the national government to
extend control. It can be easier for the national government to communicate complex ideas, such
as new democratic institutions and practices, to citizens who are literate and have schooling.
Education has been shown to directly support democracy by reducing the appeal of extreme
doctrines and developing tolerance in the population (Lipset, 1959). For this reason we test this
relationship contingent on Democracy. We measure the impact of Education on evenness with the
average years of education among citizens older than 15. These data are derived from Morrisson
& Murtin (2009) and can be found in the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et. al. 2018a).
An added benefit of examining alternative explanations focused on the extension of
national government control is that they are also tests of spuriousness. It is plausible that State
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capacity, Armed conflict, GDP per capita, and Education could facilitate the national government
controlling corruption, shifting toward a unitary system, and centralizing candidate selection as
well as reducing unevenness in subnational election quality and respect for civil liberties.
It is also possible that greater uniformity in subnational elections and civil liberties results
from external influences, rather than from increased national government control. This could be
true at either end of the regime spectrum: pockets of non-democracy within a democratic-leaning
country may democratize when the country’s neighbors are more democratic, or pockets of
democracy within an authoritarian-learning country may grow more authoritarian when the
country’s neighbors are more authoritarian. This logic is supported by research on individual
countries that has demonstrated that democratic neighboring countries can contribute to the
democratization of subnational units in nearby non-democratic countries and thus promote
unevenness in subnational regime type (e.g. Lankina and Getachew 2006). We test this using the
indicator Diverse regime neighborhood, which we created by taking the average difference between a
country’s V-Dem Liberal Democracy Index score and that of its contiguous neighbors. Higher
values indicate a greater difference between a country's level of democracy and its neighbors' level
of democracy. The variable is equal to zero for countries with no neighbors, since without
neighbors they would not be exposed to this kind of external influence.
A final alternative explanation we consider is the spontaneous development of democracy
in those subnational political units that remained non-democratic following a country’s democratic
transition. Just as the economic development of a country has been shown to affect its regime type
(Epstein et al., 2016; Lipset, 1959), it is plausible that uniform levels of economic development
across a country’s subnational political units also result in uniform subnational election freeness
and fairness and respect for government officials throughout the country. We test this using Lee
and Rogers’ measure Regional inequality, which is the variance in subnational regions’ GDP weighted
by population (Lee and Rogers, 2017). Because this measure captures variance, we would expect
that as variance decreases unevenness would as well, whether the country is at the authoritarian or
democratic end of the spectrum.6
Before testing these alternative explanations and our hypotheses, we first introduce our
measures of unevenness and examine patterns in unevenness.

6 A different alternative explanation about subnational economic variation is Carlos Gervasoni’s (2010) argument that
subnational variation in receipt of central government subsidies can account for subnational regime variation.
Unfortunately, there is not a global measure of this concept, so we were unable to test it.
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III. Measures of Unevenness
From the V-Dem dataset,7 we use a measure of the freeness and fairness of subnational elections
(Subnational election unevenness) and a measure of government officials’ respect for civil liberties (Civil
liberties unevenness). These measures capture two central conceptualizations of democracy—the
electoral conceptualization and the liberal conceptualization (Coppedge et al., 2011). The
indicators neither measure every conceptualization of democracy (e.g. egalitarianism) nor do they
capture every component of democracy (e.g. judicial independence). However, they encapsulate
conceptualizations and components central to understanding regime type. They also exclude
concepts, such as sovereignty and stability, that are not part of regime type and thus would impede
our ability to idenfity generalizable factors that facilitate greater evenness. Validity tests of these
two indicators demonstrate that they measure the underlying concepts well (McMann, 2018).
Together, the measures provide an overall picture of the extent to which regime type varies across
the territory of a country.
Questions used to collect data for these two indicators are identical in structure. The
subnational elections question asks, “Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary
across different areas of the country?” The civil liberties questions, asks “Does government respect
for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?” There are three possible response
categories: 0 = some subnational units differ significantly from others in the country, 1 = some
subnational units differ from others in the country, and 2 = equivalence across most or all
subnational units. Prior to the subnational election question in the data collection instrument, two
subnational levels have been identified for evaluating election quality—regional, meaning the
second-highest level of government just below the national government, and local, meaning the
level below the region. For countries with more than two subnational levels, approximately onequarter of countries, each regional and local level “that, in practice, has the most responsibilities
(e.g. making laws, providing primary education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to
carry out those responsibilities” is used (McMann, 2018; Coppedge et al., 2017).
As the complete text of the two questions and various response-categories indicate (see
Appendix Table A1), the variables measure how severe the differences are among areas of a
country, but they do not quantify how many subnational units differ.8 Although the measures do
7 We use version 8 of the dataset from year 1900 through 2017. We do not use Historical V-Dem data, extending
from 1789 to 1899, because in version 8 those data are not complete and fully integrated with the more contemporary
data.
8 Whether a disputed territory is coded as a separate country or as part of another country depends on whether it
meets the requirements of being a coding unit, as described in the Country Coding Units document. This document
also provides information about how specific disputed territories are treated (Coppedge et al., 2018b).
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not capture all dimensions of subnational regime variation, their geographic and temporal coverage
do enable us to begin to understand how unevenness decreases.
Data for these two measures comes from country-expert coders, generally academics or
members of nongovernmental organizations and typically residents or citizens of the country they
are coding. For each indicator, an average of five coders with expertise in elections or civil liberties
are enlisted, resulting in five separate codings. Coders’ responses are aggregated in a measurement
model that employs Bayesian item response theory (IRT) modeling techniques to estimate latent
polity characteristics from each set of expert ratings. This model provides point estimates as well
as estimates of uncertainty, which are based on inter-coder reliability and other features of the
coders.9
The resulting indicators for subnational election and civil liberties unevenness are only
moderately correlated (Pearson’s r=0.53), suggesting that they measure different dimensions of
regime type at the subnational level. For this reason, we examine each of them separately in our
analysis.
Histograms, not pictured here, show a continuous distribution for each indicator.
Consequently, we use linear models in our analysis.

IV. General Patterns
Unevenness after democratic transition is common, evident in different eras and regions of the
world. Yet, only in approximately half the cases do countries then experience a change toward
greater evenness. These patterns underscore the importance of identifying factors that promote
territorial consolidation.
By definition, unevenness is most likely to occur in a hybrid regime—one that includes
authoritarian and democratic elements.10 If a country is perfectly democratic or authoritarian, it
would not have unevenness. This suggests a curvilinear relationship between unevenness and
regime type, which is illustrated in Figure 1. Here we see that unevenness is most commonly found
in hybrid regimes and evenness is most commonly found in authoritarian or democratic regimes.11

9 Additional details about coder recruitment, selection, and characteristics and the measurement model are available
in online V-Dem documents (Coppedge et al., 2018c; Pemstein et al., 2015).
10 For the definition of hybrid regimes, see Diamond (2002).
11 The lower level of evenness in civil liberties, relative to subnational election freeness and fairness, in countries ruled
by authoritarian national regimes is likely indicative of the need for a national regime to exert control over more
officials to maintain equivalent civil liberties abuses, than to maintain equivalently low quality subnational elections,
as our theory suggests. The lower level of civil liberties evenness in authoritarian regimes, relative to democratic
regimes, is likely indicative of the fact that while violating civil liberties is a tool of authoritarian national regimes used
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Figure 1: The Curvilinear Relationship between Evenness and Regime Type
Subnational Election Evenness in 2016
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Level of Democracy (Polyarchy index)

Scatter plots with Civil Liberties Evenness (N=178) or Subnational Election Evenness (N=165) on the y-axis and
Regime Type on the x-axis. Cross-national data from 2016. Fractional-polynomial prediction indicated by red curve.

Though our analysis examines the drivers of evenness in either direction (i.e. toward
autocracy or democracy), we are especially interested in how countries move up and to the right
on this U-shaped curve, from uneven hybrid regimes to even democracies.
Many countries that have shifted toward democracy nonetheless exhibit unevenness,
stressing that this is an important phenomenon to study. Of 192 cases of democratic transition
between 1900 and 2014,12 33 percent exhibited high levels of civil liberties unevenness, subnational
election unevenness, or both forms of unevenness afterwards. Further, we observe high levels of
unevenness post-transition across different waves of democratization and world regions.
Only about half of democratic transitions have been followed by increases in evenness,
indicating that territorial consolidation of democracy is not guaranteed. Following the 192
democratic transitions, in only 16 percent of cases did government officials’ respect for civil
liberties and subnational election freeness and fairness grow more even. There were also cases
when and where needed, protection of civil liberties throughout the country is an objective of democratic national
regimes.
12 Cases of democratic transition were defined as countries that had an average score between 0.5 and 0.8 on the
Liberal Democracy Index over a 10-year period and then had a higher score in the subsequent 10-year period. While
the exact number of democratic transitions would vary with different scores and a different time span, the point
remains that unevenness is common after democratic transition.
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where only one became more even: in 23 percent of cases only government officials’ respect for
civil liberties grew more even and in 15 percent of cases only subnational election freeness and
fairness grew more even. It was most common for neither to grow more even; this was true in 46
percent of the cases.13 Again, we observe these trends across different regions and waves of
democratization.
In sum, greater evenness occurs after only about half the cases of democratic transition
and in less than a fifth of the cases in both civil liberties and the freeness and fairness of subnational
elections. Progress on territorial consolidation is not guaranteed. This raises the question of which
factors help produce this important outcome.

V. Analysis
We test our hypotheses in Tables 1-4 using linear regression models that include country and year
fixed effects, as well as country-clustered standard errors. The dependent variable is Civil liberties
(CL) evenness or Subnational elections (SE) evenness. Each of the models presented also includes
Democracy and Democracy2. We include these variables to account for the observation, mentioned
above, that countries with hybrid regimes are more likely to experience unevenness. Since it is not
our intention to explain why such regimes experience greater unevenness, we choose instead to
control for this general pattern in the data, and thereby to focus our analysis on the remaining
within-country variation in each dependent variable.14 Independent variables are lagged one year
behind the dependent variable in all models.
Models in Table 1 test our key hypotheses regarding Corruption control, Unitary government,
and Centralized candidate selection. The results are consistent with our hypotheses. The findings
indicate that while Corruption control has a positive and statistically significant effect on both types
of evenness (Models 1-4), Unitary government and Centralized candidate selection only appear influential
in the case of SE evenness (Models 2 and 4).15 We see further from Models 2 and 4 that the effect

13 When evenness increases following democratic transition, it tends to endure. In 80 percent of the cases where
government officials’ respect for civil liberties grew more even and in 75 percent of the cases where subnational
election freeness and fairness grew more even, ten years later the level remained the same or had increased.
14 Not surprisingly, we see that adding Democracy and Democracy2 greatly improves model fit, producing lower values
of AIC and BIC.
Within-country variation accounts for approximately 25 percent of unevenness in civil liberties or subnational election
freeness and fairness; whereas between-country variation accounts for the remainder. This is evident from running an
empty multilevel model, with years nested inside countries. The focus of this paper is within-country variation as
earlier work has examined between-country variation. McMann et al. 2016a.
15 Because changes in Unitary government are relatively rare, we removed a case that was the best fit for our model and
ran the test again as a robustness check. We found that a single case does not drive our results, thus giving us more
confidence in our finding.
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of Centralized candidate selection is conditional on the level of Democracy in a country, with larger effects
taking place in more democratic regimes.
Table 1: Explaining Change in Evenness Over Time within Countries
VARIABLES
Corruption control
Unitary government

(1)
CL
0.194***
[0.047]

-0.162
[0.113]
0.395***
[0.125]

(2)
CL
0.146**
[0.062]
-0.047
[0.049]
0.016
[0.095]
-0.243
[0.194]
-0.007
[0.213]
0.339**
[0.153]

-0.762***
[0.131]
0.900***
[0.144]

(4)
SE
0.198**
[0.086]
0.056**
[0.025]
0.234**
[0.112]
-0.335*
[0.192]
-0.329
[0.209]
0.630***
[0.184]

17474
181
117
0.158
-30680
-29756

11255
169
115
0.212
-24163
-23283

13559
177
117
0.192
-22950
-22055

9859
165
115
0.211
-18509
-17646

Centralized candidate selection
Candidate selection x Democracy
Democracy
Democracy2
Observations
Countries
Years
R-squared (within)
AIC
BIC

(3)
SE
0.187***
[0.065]

Dependent variable is civil liberties evenness (CL) or subnational election evenness (SE); larger values represent
greater evenness. Country-clustered standard errors in brackets. All right-side variables measured at t-1. All models
include year and country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

To test our claims about the impact of different forms of corruption, we also provide
disaggregated results using each of the four components of the Corruption Control index: Public
sector corruption control, Executive corruption control, Judicial corruption control, Legislature corruption control.
Each component of the index is an interval measure with a range of 0 to 1. Models in Table 2 test
each component individually (Models 2-5 and 8-11) and together (Models 6 and 12) on the same
sample of country-years, to allow for a direct comparison of coefficients and standard errors as
well as model fit. The results are consistent with our argument. Looking at the case of civil liberties,
the findings indicate that each component of the Corruption control index has a positive and
statistically significant impact on evenness. The contribution of each is further evidenced by the
fact that their significance drops when all are added to the model. In the case of elections, we find
more variation in the behavior of each component in the index. Here, only the coefficients for
Executive corruption control and Legislature corruption control have p-values less than 0.05; these
components also produce the greatest improvement in model fit. Only Executive corruption control
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Table 2: The Effect of Corruption on Evenness
VARIABLES
Corruption control
Public sector corruption
control

(1)
CL
0.171***
[0.051]

(2)
CL

(4)
CL

(5)
CL

0.110***
[0.036]

Executive corruption control

(3)
CL

Judicial corruption control

(6)
CL
-0.033

0.147***
[0.042]

Legislature corruption control

0.206***
[0.069]

Unitary government

0.150**
[0.061]

[0.059]
0.126**
[0.061]
0.103
[0.074]
0.029
[0.064]

-0.111
[0.106]
0.331***
[0.123]

-0.146
[0.108]
0.392***
[0.128]

-0.162
[0.109]
0.392***
[0.125]

-0.098
[0.105]
0.332***
[0.123]

-0.074
[0.106]
0.331***
[0.126]

-0.127
[0.105]
0.343***
[0.120]

12924
180
117
0.190
-25189
-24300

12924
180
117
0.175
-24941
-24052

12924
180
117
0.192
-25214
-24325

12924
180
117
0.181
-25035
-24146

12924
180
117
0.176
-24956
-24067

12924
180
117
0.197
-25291
-24380

9020
165
115
0.244
-17552
-16699

Candidate selection x Democracy

Democracy2
Observations
Countries
Years
R-squared (within)
AIC
BIC

(8)
SE

(9)
SE

(10)
SE

(11)
SE

(12)
SE

0.081
[0.055]

0.041*
[0.023]
0.179
[0.130]
-0.295
[0.211]
-0.516**
[0.239]
0.782***
[0.196]

Centralized candidate selection

Democracy

(7)
SE
0.227***
[0.084]

-0.157*
0.208***
[0.073]

0.191
[0.117]

0.042*
[0.025]
0.155
[0.136]
-0.260
[0.214]
-0.554**
[0.249]
0.848***
[0.202]

0.046*
[0.024]
0.190
[0.131]
-0.330
[0.211]
-0.557**
[0.246]
0.848***
[0.195]

0.048*
[0.025]
0.165
[0.135]
-0.246
[0.211]
-0.523**
[0.249]
0.794***
[0.212]

0.179**
[0.078]
0.041*
[0.024]
0.156
[0.131]
-0.255
[0.212]
-0.495**
[0.243]
0.786***
[0.198]

9020
165
115
0.213
-17186
-16333

9020
165
115
0.251
-17625
-16772

9020
165
115
0.222
-17285
-16432

9020
165
115
0.226
-17335
-16483

Dependent variable is civil liberties evenness (CL) or subnational election evenness (SE); larger values represent greater evenness. Country-clustered standard errors in
brackets. All right-side variables measured at t-1. All models include year and country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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[0.081]
0.287***
[0.110]
0.062
[0.111]
0.022
[0.083]
0.053**
[0.026]
0.196
[0.130]
-0.333
[0.207]
-0.526**
[0.247]
0.834***
[0.205]
9020
165
115
0.262
-17763
-16889

Table 3: Alternative Explanations – Civil Liberties Evenness

VARIABLES
State capacity index
Armed conflict (internal)

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

(12)

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

CL

0.127**
[0.063]
-0.086
[0.130]
0.327**
[0.144]
11393
135
111
0.150
-21924
-21095

0.020*
[0.011]

-0.015
[0.012]

Diverse regime neighborhood

0.009
[0.006]

Regional inequality

0.037
[0.034]

GDP per capita, logged

0.029*
[0.016]
-0.042

GDP per capita, logged x
Democracy

[0.028]

Education 15+

0.152***
[0.052]
-0.147
[0.119]
0.345**
[0.154]

0.164***
[0.053]
-0.170
[0.119]
0.381**
[0.155]

0.209***
[0.056]
-0.140
[0.130]
0.344**
[0.137]

0.211***
[0.056]
-0.138
[0.130]
0.344**
[0.137]

0.172***
[0.059]
-0.184*
[0.105]
0.373***
[0.127]

0.168***
[0.060]
-0.160
[0.103]
0.344***
[0.125]

-0.013
[0.067]
-0.333*
[0.188]
0.492**
[0.229]

-0.004
[0.069]
-0.327*
[0.189]
0.488**
[0.230]

0.174***
[0.050]
0.189
[0.184]
0.435**
[0.191]

0.178***
[0.049]
-0.063
[0.112]
0.286**
[0.139]

0.007
[0.009]
-0.014
[0.011]
0.133**
[0.064]
-0.110
[0.130]
0.489**
[0.194]

7224
161
51
0.148
-17137
-16765

7224
161
51
0.142
-17087
-16722

13744
166
101
0.140
-26196
-25414

13744
166
101
0.139
-26179
-25403

11201
168
117
0.222
-24425
-23553

11201
168
117
0.218
-24361
-23497

1365
75
54
0.233
-4033
-3778

1365
75
54
0.231
-4031
-3781

11243
152
117
0.199
-21391
-20504

11243
152
117
0.193
-21304
-20432

11393
135
111
0.154
-21975
-21131

Education 15+ x Democracy
Corruption control
Democracy
Democracy2
Observations
Countries
Years
R-squared (within)
AIC
BIC

Dependent variable is civil liberties evenness (CL); larger values represent greater evenness. Country-clustered standard errors in brackets. All right-side variables
measured at t-1. All models include year and country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Alternative Explanations – Subnational Election Evenness
VARIABLES
State capacity index
Armed conflict (internal)

(1)
SE

(2)
SE

0.003
[0.010]

(3)
SE

(4)
SE

-0.014
[0.011]

Diverse regime neighborhood

(5)
SE

(6)
SE

0.012
[0.009]

Regional inequality

(7)
SE

(8)
SE

0.040
[0.029]

GDP per capita, logged

(9)
SE

(10)
SE

(11)
SE

(12)
SE

0.241***
[0.085]
0.038
[0.030]
0.264**
[0.119]
-0.366
[0.226]
-0.295
[0.235]
0.603***
[0.197]
8108
131
111
0.237
-15742
-14930

-0.004
[0.017]
-0.060
[0.045]

GDP per capita, logged x
Democracy
Education 15+

0.115*
[0.063]
0.041
[0.034]
0.149
[0.091]
-0.426*
[0.219]
-0.220
[0.248]
0.513**
[0.211]

0.116*
[0.063]
0.041
[0.033]
0.151*
[0.090]
-0.427*
[0.218]
-0.222
[0.248]
0.517**
[0.212]

0.221**
[0.096]
0.046**
[0.022]
0.257**
[0.120]
-0.376
[0.229]
-0.258
[0.228]
0.594***
[0.191]

0.223**
[0.096]
0.045**
[0.022]
0.264**
[0.121]
-0.379*
[0.228]
-0.248
[0.226]
0.588***
[0.190]

0.209**
[0.088]
0.049*
[0.026]
0.197*
[0.115]
-0.298
[0.184]
-0.411*
[0.217]
0.686***
[0.195]

0.203**
[0.087]
0.054**
[0.026]
0.204*
[0.117]
-0.301
[0.191]
-0.372*
[0.208]
0.643***
[0.184]

0.058
[0.066]
-0.005
[0.013]
0.332
[0.204]
-0.470*
[0.240]
0.221
[0.220]
0.024
[0.147]

0.069
[0.069]
-0.003
[0.013]
0.328
[0.210]
-0.460*
[0.247]
0.220
[0.222]
0.025
[0.147]

0.199**
[0.094]
0.069***
[0.025]
0.252*
[0.133]
-0.421*
[0.235]
0.126
[0.323]
0.818***
[0.275]

0.181**
[0.091]
0.074***
[0.026]
0.240*
[0.136]
-0.363
[0.239]
-0.256
[0.240]
0.569***
[0.195]

0.019**
[0.007]
-0.036**
[0.018]
0.253***
[0.085]
0.016
[0.016]
0.267**
[0.111]
-0.492**
[0.195]
-0.266
[0.212]
0.991***
[0.308]

6165
154
51
0.171
-13934
-13551

6165
154
51
0.171
-13936
-13559

7593
154
101
0.202
-14711
-13969

7593
154
101
0.200
-14700
-13965

9296
158
115
0.211
-17519
-16655

9296
158
115
0.205
-17451
-16595

1321
73
50
0.138
-4803
-4538

1321
73
50
0.132
-4795
-4536

8329
142
115
0.230
-15641
-14791

8329
142
115
0.219
-15531
-14694

8108
131
111
0.262
-16006
-15180

Education 15+ x Democracy
Corruption control
Unitary government
Centralized candidate selection
Candidate selection x Democracy
Democracy
Democracy2
Observations
Countries
Years
R-squared (within)
AIC
BIC

Dependent variable is subnational election evenness (SE); larger values represent greater evenness. Country-clustered standard errors in brackets. All right-side
variables measured at t-1. All models include year and country fixed effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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remains significant and its coefficient in the correct direction when the other corruption indicators
are included in the model. 16
Models in Tables 3 and 4 test each of the alternative explanations, showing both individual
tests (odd numbered models) and a comparison to our benchmark model using the same sample
of country-years (even numbered models). We test the first alternative explanation regarding the
effect of State capacity in Models 1-2. While adding this variable provides a small improvement in
model fit in the case of CL evenness, it does not improve model fit at all in the case of SE evenness.
Similarly, while the effect is positive, as expected, it is not significant in the case of SE evenness
and only marginally significant, at the 0.10 level, in the case of CL evenness. We obtain similar null
findings with respect to other alternative explanations, namely Armed conflict (Models 3-4), GDP per
capita (Models 5-6), Education (Models 7-8), Diverse regime neighborhood (Models 9-10), and Regional
inequality (Models 11-12). In each case, the added variable produces at best a marginal improvement
to model fit and none of the coefficients reach standard levels of statistical significance (i.e. pvalues less than 0.05). The relatively small number of country-years with armed conflict—only 10
percent—likely accounts for this variable’s lack of influence on unevenness. The weak results for
State capacity, Armed conflict, GDP per capita, and Education also increase confidence that our argument
is not spurious. With the exception of those variables for which only much shorter time series are
available (State capacity and Economic diversity), we still find significant effects in Tables 3 and 4 for
our three variables of interest, as predicted: Corruption control (in the case of both CL and SE
evenness), Unitary government (in the case of SE evenness), and Centralized candidate selection (in the
case of SE evenness).
In sum, the statistical analysis provides support for our argument that corruption control
promotes evenness in both civil liberties and subnational elections, with control of a variety of
forms of corruption being important to the former and control of executive corruption being
particularly important to the latter. The findings also support our argument that a shift toward a
more unitary form of government and a more centralized means of selecting candidates for the
national legislature increase evenness in subnational election freeness and fairness. The lack of
support for alternative explanations further increases confidence in our argument.

16 V-Dem data appear on both sides of the equation, for the dependent variables and also for the corruption index
indicators and Centralized candidate selection. However, it is unlikely that this accounts for our results because different
country experts tend to code the variables on each side of the equation. V-Dem data collection is divided into surveys
and these dependent and independent variables appear on different surveys. We are unable to conduct robustness
checks using alternative data because no such data exist for the dependent variables and Centralized candidate selection
(McMann, 2018). For corruption, the time series of the other datasets are too short to examine within-country
variation, or, in the case of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, the data are not designed for
time series analysis (McMann et al., 2016b).

Our argument is also consistent with our empirical finding in the General Patterns section
that 23 percent of countries grew more even in government officials’ respect for civil liberties but
only 15 percent of countries became more even in subnational election freeness and fairness,
following democratic transition. It is likely that institutional changes that facilitate the latter are
less common than corruption campaigns that contribute to both forms of unevenness. We know,
for example, that only nine countries in our dataset experienced a shift on the unitary-federal
spectrum. The lower frequency of institutional changes would help explain why increased
uniformity in subnational election freeness and fairness is less common than greater evenness in
government officials’ respect for civil liberties.

VI. Illustrations
To illustrate our argument, we describe the relationships in four countries: Namibia, Sweden,
Serbia, and Venezuela. While all four have experienced a democratic transition at some point in
their histories, only in Namibia, Sweden, and Serbia were those transitions followed by an increase
in a type of evenness. The fact that Namibia and Sweden did not become more even on both
dimensions is consistent with the descriptive statistics and our argument that the two dimensions
are distinct.
As Figure 2 illustrates with the black dashed line, Namibia underwent a democratic
transition in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As corruption control increased in the late 1980s,
government officials’ respect for civil liberties grew more even—evident from the gray dashed and
solid black lines, respectively. Evenness in the freeness and fairness of subnational elections did
not increase; in fact, it decreased a bit even though corruption control increased. However,
consistent with our argument, the other two factors were not favorable to greater evenness in
freeness and fairness of subnational elections: candidate selection decentralized (the dotted gray
line) and Namibia’s government system remained between a unitary and federal system (black
dotted line).17 The three variables’ relationships with evenness in subnational election freeness and
fairness underscore our earlier points that these variables are independent and do not need to act
in unison in order for there to be an effect. They also serve as a reminder that our argument is
based on generalized relationships and our analysis captures average effects; whereas each
democratic transition exhibits unique characteristics.

17 The Unitary Government variable lacks data from before 1990, but the system of government was comparable in
the 1980s (Tonchi, Lindeke and Grotpeter, 2012; Williams and Hackland, 2015).
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Figure 2: Illustrations
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Sweden achieved parliamentary democracy by 1914 after which it transitioned to a modern
democracy with mass suffrage, among other attributes, consistent with the black dashed line in
Figure 2. As a parliamentary democracy at the beginning of its transition to a full democracy,
Sweden continued to face unevenness in the freeness and fairness of subnational elections, albeit
not a significant amount, as depicted by the solid gray line. However, with more centralized
candidate selection (gray dotted line), subnational election freeness and fairness grew more
uniform. Corruption control remained high and the country maintained a unitary system of
government, illustrating again that the variables do not need to act in unison in order for there to
be an effect.
Serbia also experienced increased evenness in subnational election freeness and fairness
following a democratic transition in the late 1990s. In this case a change in the system of
government—from federal to unitary—was influential, as the black dotted line in Figure 2 depicts.
Following this dramatic shift, subnational election freeness and fairness grew more uniform as
shown by the solid gray line. By contrast, candidate selection grew slightly more localized (gray
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dotted line) and corruption control (the dashed gray line) increased at the same time as evenness
in subnational election freeness and fairness. This suggests that one of the variables can have an
effect without acting in unison with the others. With regard to government officials’ respect civil
liberties (solid black line), its increased uniformity is consistent with our argument about the
positive relationship with corruption control.
Venezuela is a contrasting case: the country underwent a democratic transition in the late
1950s, but it did not grow more even in either respect, as our argument would predict. Civil
liberties unevenness remained a problem throughout this period until the late 1990s, after which
democracy eroded (black solid line). Corruption control remained relatively steady (gray dashed
line), varying within a relatively small range, consistent with our argument. Subnational election
freeness and fairness drops (solid gray line) as candidate selection grows more localized (gray
dotted line). Venezuela maintained a federal system and corruption control, as noted above, stayed
relatively stable, emphasizing the independent effect of candidate selection.
In addition to illustrating our argument, these countries highlight that these relationships
hold across different regions and waves of democratization. Among the four, Africa, Europe, and
Latin America are represented as are the three waves of democratization.

VII. Conclusions
This paper examines the unstudied puzzle of how unevenness in the development of democracy
is reduced with the objective of establishing a theory of the territorial consolidation of democracy.
Whereas other studies have focused on explaining the development and persistence of nondemocratic enclaves in recently democratized or hybrid regimes, we investigate the factors that
help eradicate these enclaves and thus territorially consolidate democracy within countries.
Our findings suggest that greater progress toward territorial consolidation of democracy
can be made by strengthening national governments’ abilities to carry out their democratic
mandates. Our analysis showed that reducing corrupt practices, which distract officials and
bureaucrats from these mandates, and shifting toward a unitary system of government and
centralized candidate selection, which empower national officials relative to subnational ones,
made democracy more even throughout countries. These specific tools for extending control over
territory were shown to be more effective than high state capacity generally. The finding that an
absence of armed conflict does not promote consolidation is likely more indicative of the fact that
it is a relatively rare occurrence rather than that its absence is not an important precondition.
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These specific tools for extending national government control over territory were also
more helpful to territorial consolidation than socioeconomic or international change. Increased
country wealth, education levels, evenness in subnational regions’ wealth, and democracy of a
country’s neighbors did not help move countries toward democratic consolidation. These findings
suggest that practitioners should invest in corruption control and some government and party
centralization, rather than socioeconomic change, to help consolidate democracy.
Theoretically, this paper helps to revive the idea of democratic consolidation and unpack
the “black box” between democratic transition and democratic consolidation. We argue that a key
component of democratic consolidation is the emergence of democracy throughout the territory
of a country. And, tools, such as corruption control, more unitary government, and more
centralized candidate selection, can best facilitate this territorial consolidation of democracy.
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Appendix
Appendix Table A1: Variable Definitions
Dependent Variables
Civil liberties evenness. Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?
0: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not
respect) civil liberties. 1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties
somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country. 2: Yes.
Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively,
significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country. This original scale is reversed so that
higher values indicate greater evenness. Source: V-Dem. v2clrgunev
Subnational election unevenness. Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different
areas of the country? Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices. 0: No. Subnational
elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not
fair). 1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or,
alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country. 2: Yes.
Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively,
significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country. This original scale is
reversed so that higher values indicate greater evenness. Source: V-Dem. v2elsnlsff
Independent Variables
Armed conflict (internal). Did the country experience an internal armed conflict? Coded 1 if true in a given
year, 0 otherwise. Source: V-Dem. e_miinterc
Centralized candidate selection. How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties? 0:
National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders. 1: National legislative candidate
selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level
organizations. 2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party
organization. 3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with
some input from local party organizations or constituency groups. 4: National legislative candidates are chosen by
a small cadre of local or municipal level actors. 5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency
groups or direct primaries. This original scale is reversed so that higher values indicate less local control (i.e. more
centralized candidate selection). Source: V-Dem. selection
Corruption control. How pervasive is political corruption? The index is arrived at by taking the average of (a)
public sector corruption index (v2x_pubcorr); (b) executive corruption index (v2x_execorr); (c) the indicator for
legislative corruption (v2lgcrrpt); and (d) the indicator for judicial corruption (v2jucorrdc). In other words, these
four different government spheres are weighted equally in the resulting index. We replace missing values for
countries with no legislature by only taking the average of (a), (b) and (d). The original scale is reserved so that
higher values indicate less corruption. Source: V-Dem. v2x_corr
Democracy. An index measuring the extent to which the ideal of liberal democracy is achieved.. Source: V-Dem.
v2x_libdem
Democracy2. Quadratic form of Democracy variable. See above.
Diverse regime neighborhood. Average gap (as an absolute value) between the Democracy score of the country
of interest and that of each of its contiguous neighbors. demo_neighbors
Economic diversity. Measures regional inequality within a country using a population weighted coefficient of
variance. Source: Lee and Rogers (2017).
Education 15+. The average years of education among citizens older than 15. Source: V-Dem. e_peaveduc
Executive corruption control. How routinely do members of the executive, or their agents grant favors in
exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or
misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? The index is formed by taking
the average of the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive bribery
(v2exbribe) and executive embezzlement (v2exembez). Higher values indicate less corruption. Source: V-Dem.
v2x_execorr
GDP per capita (ln). Gross domestic product per capita. Source: Maddison (2010). e_migdppcln
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Judicial corruption control. How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or
bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision? 0: Always. 1: Usually. 2:
About half of the time. 3: Not usually. 4: Never. Higher values indicate less corruption. Source: V-Dem. v2jucorrdc
Legislature corruption control. Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain? 0:
Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities. 1: Often. Many legislators probably engage in
these activities. 2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities. 3: Very occasionally. There
may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not. 4: Never, or hardly ever.
Higher values indicate less corruption. Source: V-Dem. v2lgcrrpt
Public sector corruption control. To what extent do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for
bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements, and how often do they steal, embezzle, or misappropriate
public funds or other state resources for personal or family use? The index is formed by taking the average of the
point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for public sector bribery (v2excrptps) and
embezzlement (v2exthftps). Higher values indicate less corruption. Source: V-Dem. v2x_pubcorr
State capacity index. An index of state capacity based on 24 separate components; calculated using Bayesian
latent variable analysis. Source: Hanson and Sigman (2013). Capacity
Unitary government*. Measures whether the state is (1) Federal, (2) Hybrid, or (3) Unitary. From Pippa Norris.
Source: Quality of Government Standard Dataset 2013 (Teorell et al., 2013). unitary
* These non-V-Dem variables were manually extended by conducting research in order to improve their
coverage. Variable names from the paper’s dataset appear at the end of each entry.
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Appendix Table A2: Descriptive Statistics
(1)
N

(2)
mean

(3)
sd

(4)
min

(5)
max

(6)
countries

Civil liberties evenness
Subnational elections evenness

18,278
13,950

0.561
0.610

0.227
0.244

0
0

1
1

182
178

Armed conflict (internal)
Centralized candidate selection
Corruption control
Democracy
Diverse regime neighborhood
Economic diversity
Education 15+
Executive corruption control
GDP per capita, logged
Judicial corruption control
Legislature corruption control
Public sector corruption control
State capacity index
Unitary government

14,332
18,211
18,018
17,757
11,677
1,366
11,640
18,154
11,425
18,113
13,403
18,128
7,272
11,342

0.0857
0.676
0.546
0.248
0.169
0.341
4.490
0.538
8.356
0.549
0.501
0.556
0.00138
0.788

0.280
0.187
0.281
0.250
0.125
0.225
3.384
0.306
1.130
0.206
0.208
0.296
1.003
0.375

0
0
0.0229
0.00244
0
0.00167
0.0100
0
4.898
0
0
0
-2.884
0

1
1
0.995
0.903
0.756
2.490
13.30
1
12.30
1
1
1
2.510
1

168
182
181
182
173
75
135
182
153
181
181
182
162
169

VARIABLES
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